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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ASTANA2273,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09ASTANA2273**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09ASTANA2273	2009-12-31 07:44	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Astana

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988311.ece>

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2273/01 3650744
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310744Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7141
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0549
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1617
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0244
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2379
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0098
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2662

S E C R E T ASTANA 002273

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2029 TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [MNUC](#) [KNNP](#) [IR](#) [JA](#) [KZ](#)

REF: A. ASTANA 2257 B. SECSTATE 131723 C. ASTANA 2158

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)

1. (S) SUMMARY: The government of Kazakhstan publicly and privately denied allegations of negotiations between Iran and KazAtomProm for the purchase of uranium enrichment technology. "NO STONE UNTURNED"
2. (S) In response to the Ambassadors December 30 demarche regarding possible negotiations between a Kazakhstani subsidiary of KazAtomProm (KAP) and Iran, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: "NO CONTRACTS, NO CONTACT, AND NO NEGOTIATIONS"
3. (S) Umarov then turned to his private report on the interagency investigation, which concluded that KAP has neither contracts nor contact with Iran. "ONE-THIRD OF KAZAKHSTANS URANIUM PRODUCTION"
4. (S) To emphasize the improbability of the sale, Umarov then recited detailed information on Baiken-Us limited mining operations and small scale uranium production. "MANDATORY END-USE CERTIFICATES"
5. (S) About transportation, Umarov told the Ambassador that all uranium exports occur exclusively by railway, and that no shipments have ever been made by air. "REPUTATION AT STAKE"
6. (S) "This investigation led to our statement, and now we have big questions for you and Washington. Information is very important because Kazakhstans reputation has been put at stake," he asserted. "If you consider us a strategic partner, as you say, you must share information with us. "INCIDENT ORCHESTRATED?"
7. (S) Umarov relayed the Kazakhstani governments request to the IAEA for the report. "The IAEA says that they do not have the report, which is a problem. "STRONGER, BROADER INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WELCOMED"
8. (S) After thanking the Ministry and government for its serious, speedy response, the Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. government is not looking for a way to restore Kazakhstans image, Umarov concluded with a request that the U.S. government make a public statement of support. "PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT?"
9. (S) Looking for a way to restore Kazakhstans image, Umarov concluded with a request that the U.S. government make a public statement of support. "PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT?"
10. (S) In a private pull-aside, Umarov told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan has some degree of suspicion that a third nation (unnamed) might be involved in the sale. "STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS"
11. (U) BEGIN DECEMBER 30 PRESS STATEMENT:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically repudiates certain news media reports alleging Kazakhstans connection to a possible deal to supply uranium enrichment technology. As is known, Kazakhstan has voluntarily renounced the worlds fourth largest nuclear and missile arsenal, shut down the worlds second largest State-owned uranium enrichment plant. Kazakhstan is firmly committed to the principles of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and tough control over the turnover of dual use materials. All the operations with nuclear materials in Kazakhstan, including our cooperation regarding peaceful use of atomic energy with foreign countries, are carried out in full compliance with international law. In this connection, Kazakhstan expects the IAEA to give an appropriate assessment of the information being disseminated by the news media.
END STATEMENT.
12. (S) BEGIN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NON-PAPER:
Thank you for providing the information on the attempts of Iranian company Nur Afzar Gostar (NAG) to purchase uranium ore from Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan unwaveringly fulfills its tight export-control obligations with respect to nuclear materials and is committed to strengthen the inte
We fully support your efforts to prevent the export of nuclear materials to the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with UN Security Counci
Based on your inquiry, the government conducted a thorough investigation of the companies you identified and took additional steps to prevent t
From our side, we request that you provide copies of materials containing further information on the companies and individuals engaged in the r
END NON-PAPER.

[13](#). (S) COMMENT: We know from other sources that Kazakhstans initial investigation was indeed swift and relatively thorough. Nonproliferation